Did Vatican II End Thomism?

There is a perception that:

The history of the modern Neo-Thomist movement… reached its end at the Second Vatican Council. (From Unity to Pluralism, p. 230)

Did Thomism (or neo-Thomism, as its modern version is sometimes called) really reach its end at Vatican II?

1. What Is Thomism?

A simple understanding of Thomism can be obtained from encyclopedias.

The Catholic Encyclopedia (of 1912) states:

Thomism is the name given to the system which follows the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas in philosophical and theological questions.

The Encyclopedia Britannica states:

Thomism [is] the theology and philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas… and its various interpretations [and] usages.

The Routledge Encyclopedia states:

Deriving from Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century, Thomism is a body of philosophical and theological ideas that seeks to articulate the intellectual content of Catholic Christianity.

Wikipedia states:

Thomism is the philosophical and theological school which arose as a legacy of the work and thought of Thomas Aquinas.

These descriptions of Thomism illustrate three important points.

Firstly, Thomism originates in the thinking of St. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) and it “follows” and “derives” from Aquinas. So, Thomism cannot be reduced to just what Aquinas said.

Secondly, Thomism includes philosophy. It is not just a theological set of claims.

Thirdly, Thomism is a “system” of thinking. It is not just a set of principles.

2. Why Thomism?

The rise of Thomism was due to Pope Leo XIII’s 1879 encyclical Aeterni Patris (AP).

In that encyclical Leo XIII diagnosed one of the main problems confronting modern society as “poor thinking.” Politicians were arguing from bad principles to reach false conclusions; and that was leading to inadequate policies and legislation. As Leo XIII put it:

Whoso… seeks a reason for the troubles that vex public and private life must come to the conclusion… that false conclusions… which originated in… philosophy, have now crept into all the orders of the State. (AP 2)

Leo XIII had a simple solution. He said:

Our first and most cherished idea is that you should all furnish… a generous… supply of those purest streams of wisdom flowing… from the…  Angelic Doctor [i.e., Aquinas]. (AP 26)

Leo XIII believed that this “restoration of philosophical discipline” (AP 29) would benefit the Church and the wider world. So, Leo XIII concluded:

We exhort you… to restore the golden wisdom of St. Thomas, and to spread it far and wide for the defense… of the Catholic faith, for the good of society, and for the advantage of all the sciences. (AP 31)

By and large, Catholic colleges responded enthusiastically. By the 1960s a Thomist culture was an increasingly ubiquitous feature of Catholic education. It also impacted upon the secular world, as for example, when leading Thomists contributed to the development of the natural law legal framework for the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials (1945) and for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).

3. Thomistic Problems: Pluralism

Thomas Aquinas wrote and defended his ideas during his lifetime. After his death,  some of his ideas were challenged by thinkers such as Duns Scotus (d. 1308) and William of Ockham (d. 1347). Aquinas’ ideas were posthumously re-defended by commentators such as Thomas of Sutton (d. after 1315), Thomas Cajetan (d. 1534) and Francisco Suárez (d. 1617).

While defending Aquinas’ ideas, some of the commentators introduced modifications to Aquinas’ thinking. One of the points made in Henry de Lubac’s 1946 book Surnaturel, was that the commentators sometimes contradicted what Aquinas had actually said.

This meant that different versions of Thomism sprang up. There was a Dominican version, which broadly followed Cajetan; and there was a Jesuit version, which broadly followed Suárez. In the early decades of the twentieth century there was also a Transcendental version, which blended elements of Thomism with Kantianism.

As twentieth-century theologians began to realize that what they were calling Thomism was not necessarily what Aquinas himself had taught, figures such as Marie-Dominique Chenu (d. 1990) argued that it was necessary to ignore the commentators, and to go back to the actual texts of Aquinas himself.

This “historical version” of Thomism made sense as an attempt to clarify what Aquinas had actually taught. But it raised serious philosophical problems. How can theologians go back to the views of Aquinas himself if that means ignoring the later criticisms of Aquinas’ views, which the commentators had been responding to?

These kinds of issues meant that by the middle of the twentieth century there was a growing problem of Thomist Pluralism. It was becoming increasingly unclear which (if any) of the different versions of Thomism should count as the Thomism which Leo XIII had called for in Aeterni Patris.

The Vatican realized aspects of the problem. In 1914 it published The Twenty-Four Fundamental Theses of Official Catholic Philosophy, which were intended to clarify what counted as Thomism. However, those principles were neither specific nor detailed enough to resolve the problem of Thomist pluralism.

4. Thomistic Problems: Philosophy

When Leo XIII called for Thomism in 1879, the text of Aeterni Patris (AP) included an ambiguity around two different models of philosophy.

We can see the problem in these two sentences:

Those, therefore, who to the study of philosophy unite obedience to the Christian faith, are philosophizing in the best possible way. (AP 9)

It is equally just that philosophy should make use of its own method, principles, and arguments. (AP 8)

The first text effectively reduces philosophy to a version of Christian theology (i.e., Fides quaerens intellectum). The second text implies that philosophy is entirely independent of theology.

The tension between those rival visions of philosophy ran throughout the twentieth century. In 1998 John Paul II resolved matters. He accepted that philosophy is independent of theology. This led him to conclude that:

The Church has no philosophy of her own nor does she canonize any one particular philosophy in preference to others. The underlying reason for this …is that… philosophy must remain faithful to its own principles and methods.  (Fides et Ratio, 49)

John Paul II’s vision for philosophy is based upon an insistence that the Church’s Magisterium has “no competence” to teach purely philosophical theses. This is because the Church’s authority from Christ is to preach the gospel, not to teach philosophy. That means that the Church should only intervene in philosophical issues when they clash with Christian doctrine.

If this is so, then it raises questions about whether the Church should ever officially adopt philosophical systems (like Thomism).

When Leo XIII called for Thomism, what he was effectively doing was prescribing an “off-the-shelf” solution (Thomism) to cure a contemporary problem of philosophical principles. His specific interest in principles can be seen when he stated:

If men… take their stand on true and solid principles, there will result a vast amount of benefits for the public and private good. (AP 2, emphasis added)

One of the problems with “off-the-shelf” solutions is that they often involve elements of redundancy. Yes, a philosophical system can resolve a problem of philosophical principles but the “extra” contents which make it a system (rather than just a set of principles) will inevitably involve more than is strictly needed.

This means that by the time of Vatican II questions were beginning to arise about whether the Church really needed to teach Thomism in order to preach the gospel. If there is a problem with philosophical principles, why doesn’t the Church just correct the wrong principles, without additionally imposing a philosophical system (Thomism), especially as doing so risks distorting the Church’s relationship to philosophy itself?

5. Thomistic Problems: Monoculture

Adopting Thomism as a universal approach across the whole Church was undoubtedly beneficial in creating a more unified and standardized methodology for philosophy and theology. However, it also raised the serious risk of creating an intellectual monoculture.

A monoculture arises in organizations when there is an excessive focus on “sameness of thinking.” When that occurs, it significantly increases the risk of cognitive biases developing, such as groupthink, bandwagon effect, social contagion, echo chamber (etc.). These kinds of cognitive biases have been implicated in a range of disasters, including the Bay of Pigs military disaster in 1961 and the Challenger Space Shuttle disaster in 1986. (See “Neurodiversity and the Perils of Groupthink.”)

We now know that it is important for organizations to encourage diversity of thinking, and to value “contrarians.” Trying to limit or eradicate divergent thinking massively increases the risk that an organization will succumb to cognitive biases.

When we look at how the Vatican dealt with aspects of the 1907 Modernist Crisis and the 1940s Nouvelle Théologie Crisis, questions of coherence invariably arise. For example, theologians like Henri de Lubac and Yves Congar were disciplined and then rehabilitated, with an enduring lack of clarity about what specific theological errors they were supposed to have committed in the first place. That kind of (apparent) incoherence can all too easily suggest the symptoms of an organization in peril of succumbing to cognitive biases. (See “Modernism: Did Vatican II Save the Church From Disaster?”)

When Leo XIII implemented Thomism in 1879, the risks of monocultures and cognitive biases were not well understood. By 1965 those issues were beginning to be better understood, and so a “cost-benefit” question of Thomism inevitably began to arise. Was a continuing acceptance of the risks inherent to an intellectual monoculture of Thomism, really the most appropriate and proportionate way of resolving the specific problem, which it was implemented to deal with?

6. Thomistic Problems: History

Thomist philosophy and theology operates typically within the framework of what is given by Scripture and Tradition (and by Aristotle). That methodology was inherited from the standard textbook of the era, which was Peter Lombard’s Sentences (written around 1150). What made Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae so significant is that he rearranged the ordering and content of theology to better suit “beginners” (see Summa Preface). He didn’t significantly change the fundamental methodology of theologizing itself.

In the thirteenth century theologians were largely unaware of the way that historical issues can significantly impact upon, and raise questions about, what is assumed to be “given” by Scripture and Tradition. For example, Aquinas valued the authority of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. That was because he believed that Dionysius was a first-century disciple of St. Paul (see Acts 17:34). However, we now know that Dionysius was in fact a fifth-century writer. That new historical knowledge completely changes the significance of Dionysius’ theology.

Aquinas was also unaware of the historical and textual problems raised by Biblical Criticism, as those issues only became apparent from the seventeenth century onwards. Similarly, he was unaware of the historical problems raised by doctrinal development, as those issues only began to be clarified in the writings of nineteenth-century authors, such as John Henry Newman.

This lack of historical awareness is not a failure by Aquinas (or Thomism). All humans are limited, to varying extents, by the constraints of the information which is available at any given time. (Hence the cognitive bias of “availability bias.”)

However, these limitations started to become theological failures when twentieth-century Thomists refused to engage with the historical problems confronting Scripture and Dogma, because their Thomist methodology did not include a recognition of such historical issues. This led some historically minded theologians to feel that they needed to reject Thomism itself, in order to engage with the historical problems which critics were raising. We can see echoes of these issues in Pius X’s accusation that Modernists were anti-Thomist. (See Pascendi Gregis, 42.)

What this all meant is that although Thomism is not inherently inimical to historical issues, it could all too easily be misunderstood and misused to justify an anti-historical mindset, which ignored and discounted valid theological problems raised against Scripture and Tradition. When that occurred, instead of being a solution to the problems of the day, a distorted Thomist mindset risked becoming part of the problem itself.

7. Vatican II

When Vatican II met from 1962–65, it announced no major decisions about Thomism. However, the issues of Thomist methodology and mindset were part of the backdrop of arguments about theological style and tone. Those arguments led to almost all the draft documents being rejected by Vatican II. (See “Original Vatican II Schemas.”)

When the Council commented upon Thomism, it was careful to insist that there was an enduring value to learning theology (in its own words) “under the guidance of St. Thomas” (Optatam Totius, 16).

But the Council also avoided referring explicitly to Thomism when it stated that philosophy courses should:

…rely… on a philosophical patrimony which is perennially valid and tak(e)… into account the philosophical investigations of later ages. (Optatam Totius, 15)

The vision of Vatican II is a very different vision than that laid down by the 1917 Code of Canon Law, which stated that:

Studies in rational theology and philosophy… [should proceed] according to the system, teaching, and principles of the Angelic Doctor. (CIC 1917, 1366.2)

Vatican II did not reject Thomism, but it rebalanced the Church’s understanding of its role. It insisted that Thomism was a helpful “guidance,” but it did not endorse previous views that it was an appropriate “system” of thought, to be imposed officially upon the universal Church.

8. Post-Vatican II Thomism

In the years after Vatican II, Thomism has continued. However, it has morphed into two main intellectual approaches.

Traditionalist Thomism is largely an attempt to retrieve the style and contents of the work of authors of the first half of the twentieth century. This includes figures such as Jacques Maritain (d. 1973), Étienne Gilson (d. 1978) and Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange (d. 1964). This approach mainly explains and defends the thought of Aquinas, particularly in the context of twentieth-century (European) Continental Philosophy. This style can be seen in some more recent books, such as Dennis McInerny’s Philosophical Psychology (1999).

Analytical Thomism is a new approach. It is an engagement between Thomism and the modern Analytic Philosophy which represents the mainstream contemporary Anglo-American approach to philosophy. This approach is not so much a defense or explanation of Thomism, it is rather the use of Thomist principles and arguments to query and challenge the positions of contemporary philosophers. It can be seen in contemporary authors such as Eleonore Stump, Brian Davies and Edward Feser.

A Thomist vibrancy, particularly within Analytic Thomism, has led some contemporaries to state that even if Thomism declined in the immediate aftermath of Vatican II, it is now undergoing a revival. (See Thomas O’Meara, “Decline and revival through the mid-20^th century.”)

9. Conclusion

Some people see Vatican II’s changed emphasis with respect to Thomism as the outcome of a Modernist conspiracy or of a “mania for change.” (See “The Rise and Fall of the Thomistic Renewal.”)

But there are far simpler reasons which explain what happened. Thomism arguably achieved much of what Leo XIII set out to achieve. It unified and strengthened the Church’s theology and philosophy in its engagement with the intellectual principles favored by the modern world.

However, its implementation also involved a number of unforeseen complexities (see sections 3-6). As those complications worked themselves out during the course of the twentieth century, it became increasingly clear that aspects of the Church’s approach to thinking styles could not continue as they were.

It would be inaccurate to say that Vatican II “ended” Thomism, as it has clearly continued after the Council (see section 8). What Vatican II did, was that it re-balanced the Church’s commitment to, and use of, Thomism. This enabled the Church to continue to benefit from Thomistic thinking, while simultaneously taking action to mitigate against the kinds of risks which can arise when any beneficial solution is overly depended upon.