In 1832 Pope Gregory XVI published the encyclical Mirari Vos, which rejected religious freedom. In 1965 Vatican II published Dignitatis Humanae, which accepted religious freedom. This has led some people to claim:
The declaration Dignitatis humanae explicitly contradicts the teaching of previous Tradition… [as] religious liberty was condemned by Pope Gregory XVI. (SSPX website: “Religious Liberty”)
Is there really a contradiction?
1. The Context of Mirari Vos
The 1832 encyclical Mirari Vos was occasioned by the writings of a French priest, Lamennais (Félicité de La Mennais). Between 1830 and 1831 he published a series of articles in the magazine L’ Avenir, championing various forms of freedom, including religious freedom.
Lamennais was deeply concerned with how the State was constantly interfering in the Church. It began in the reign of Napoleon Bonaparte (1799–1815), who had stolen Church property, imprisoned bishops and even kidnapped Pope Pius VII (d. 1823). Interference was continuing in his own day and Lamennais came to the conclusion that the only way to ensure the Church’s freedom was to insist upon a total separation between Church and State, with every person having religious freedom to make their own religious choices.
Lamennais’ views were published in a context of political turmoil. In 1830 France went through a violent revolution (The July Revolution). Church property was ransacked and the archbishop of Paris had to flee into hiding. Similar revolutions occurred across Europe. (See European Revolutions of 1830.) Pope Gregory XVI tried to calm matters, urging people to obey their political leaders. (See his 1832 Cum Primum.) Fearful of Lamennais’ views inciting further revolutions, politicians from several nations demanded that the pope condemn Lamennais and his inflammatory calls for freedom(s).
Pope Gregory XVI tried to deal with matters sensitively in Mirari Vos. The encyclical opened by acknowledging the contemporary turmoil.
The Church… is… exposed to… hatred… and… vile servitude… a tremendous blow is dealt to religion and the perversion of morals is spread… We see the destruction of public order, the fall of principalities. (Mirari Vos 5)
The encyclical then went on to reject Lamennais’ calls for religious freedom, without actually naming Lamennais.
Lamennais responded in 1834 by publishing Paroles d’un croyant (which was translated into English as Words of a Believer). That book reiterated his earlier views which the pope had rebuked.
Pope Gregory XVI responded in 1834 by publishing Singulari Nos. That encyclical explicitly named Lammenais and repeated the earlier rejection of his views.
Lamennais’ response was to leave the Church.
2. The Status of Mirari Vos
The publication of Mirari Vos was partially motivated by political considerations. Pope Gregory XVI was clear that a viewpoint like Lamennais’ was politically problematic because
It arouses, fosters, and strengthens seditions, riots, and rebellions in the empires. (Singulari 6)
However, it would be a mistake to dismiss Mirari Vos as just a politically expedient rejection of what Gregory XVI described as “depraved ravings” (Singulari 5). On the contrary, the pope also taught doctrine in Mirari Vos. We know this, because he stated in the follow-up encyclical that:
We declared in it [i.e., Mirari Vos] the only sound doctrine to be followed concerning the main points in the fulfillment of the duties of Our office for the whole Catholic flock. (Singulari 1)
We have made [it] clear by the authority handed down to Us. (Singulari 3)
However, although Mirari Vos does indeed include doctrine, it does so in a contextual and limited way, which is related to what Gregory XVI called “these evil and dangerous times” (Mirari Vos 6). For example, Gregory XVI stated:
Therefore he who resists authority resists the ordinances of God. (Mirari Vos 17)
That claim is a Church teaching, but it is doctrinally incomplete. The Church also teaches that a tyrant commanding sin can and should be resisted. However, Gregory XVI did not mention that extra detail in the text above, because it was contextually irrelevant to the specific circumstances which he was addressing.
What this means is that Mirari Vos teaches doctrine, but what it teaches about matters such as religious freedom is potentially doctrinally incomplete.
3. Indifferentism
Mirari Vos leads into the topic of religious freedom by identifying a “gateway error” or slippery slope which leads to it. That error is Indifferentism. Pope Gregory XVI stated:
This shameful font of indifferentism gives rise to that absurd and erroneous proposition which claims that liberty of conscience must be maintained for everyone. (Mirari Vos 14)
He described indifferentism as follows:
Indifferentism…. is spread… by… [those] who claim that it is possible to obtain the eternal salvation of the soul by the profession of any kind of religion, as long as morality is maintained. (Mirari Vos 13)
The essential problem with indifferentism was that it rejected the dogma of the necessity of the Church (i.e., “there is no salvation outside the Church”).
It was also an irrational claim which collapsed into relativism. This is because religion typically defines morality, and different conflicting religions define different conflicting moralities. Hence disagreements between religions over matters such as Sati (i.e., whether it is morally good to burn widows to death). So how can anyone possibly “maintain morality” if it doesn’t matter which religion is followed, unless all differing conflicting moralities are (relativistically) equally valid?
Although indifferentism can lead to religious freedom, it does not mean that Lamennais himself actually believed in indifferentism, or that he argued from it to religious freedom. He explicitly rejected indifferentism in his 1817 book Essai sur l’indifférence en matière de religion (published in 1895 in English as Essay on Indifference in Matters of Religion). That book was publicly praised by Pope Leo XII (d. 1829) for its excellent exposition of doctrine.
Similarly, even though Vatican II accepted religious freedom, it did not accept indifferentism. (See “Did Vatican II Endorse Indifferentism?”) In fact, Vatican II clearly and explicitly affirmed the dogma of the necessity of the Church, and that dogma is logically incompatible with indifferentism. (See “Did Vatican II Change the Doctrine ‘No Salvation Outside the Church?’”)
What this all means is that there is no contradiction between what Mirari Vos states about indifferentism, and the position which Vatican II took in formulating its views on religious freedom.
4. Religious Freedom
Mirari Vos then turned to the topic of religious freedom, which it refers to as “freedom of conscience” (libertatem conscientiae). It uses the terminology of “conscience” because that was the traditional language used in earlier Church documents, such as Pope Benedict XIV’s 1751 A Quo Primum.
Pope Gregory XVI wrote:
[The] absurd and erroneous proposition… claims that liberty of conscience must be maintained for everyone. [However]… it spreads ruin… though some repeat… that some advantage accrues to religion from it. “But the death of the soul is worse than freedom of error,” as Augustine was wont to say… When all restraints are removed by which men are kept on the narrow path of truth, their nature, which is already inclined to evil, propels them to ruin…. Experience shows… that cities… perished as a result of this single evil, namely immoderate freedom of opinion, license of free speech, and desire for novelty. (Mirari Vos 14)
In the first three sentences of that passage, Pope Gregory XVI dealt with Lamennais’ argument for religious liberty. Lamennais had said that it was better for the Church to be free of State interference (which included State theft of Church property) by giving everyone religious freedom. Gregory XVI rejected that argument as it effectively traded the Church’s ability to secure its own property in return for potentially damning the souls of its congregations who would be exposed to religious errors when everyone was given religious freedom. Stated in those terms, Lammenais’ position involved the unethical claim that the end justifies the means.
A second important point in the text above is that it is dealing with a specific EXTREME version of religious liberty. Gregory XVI describes it as involving “when all restraints are removed” (Freno quippe omni adempto). In the last sentence he refers to the immoderateness of opinions and the “license” (excessiveness) of the free speech involved in that version of religious freedom. The original Latin is even stronger, including an additional reference to the immoderateness of what is being proposed. (See the Latin text.)
What Vatican II approved was a LIMITED version of religious freedom. It said:
This Vatican Council declares that the human person has a right to religious freedom… within due limits. (Dignitatis Humanae 2)
The Council explained what those limits included when it said:
Furthermore, society has the right to… [ensure] a proper guardianship of public morality. (Dignitatis Humanae 7)
We can see the difference between the EXTREME religious freedom rejected by Pope Gregory XVI, and the LIMITED religious freedom approved by Vatican II, by considering the example of polygamy (i.e., marrying multiple wives).
Some religions (like Islam and some versions of Mormonism) believe that polygamy is morally acceptable. Imagine if some adherents to those religions argued that their religious freedom was being infringed unless nations passed legislation to allow polygamous marriage.
Arguably, those adherents might have a case under the EXTREME version of religious freedom rejected by Pope Gregory XVI.
But they would not have a case under Vatican II’s LIMITED religious freedom, as Vatican II says that religious freedom is limited by the need to protect “public morality.” The Church believes that monogamy (i.e., not-polygamy) represents morality. Therefore Vatican II’s religious freedom is LIMITED by the need to maintain monogamy, and so it cannot confer a (religious freedom) right to polygamy.
What that example shows is that there are two different versions of religious freedom, which have two different types of practical consequences.
The existence of different versions of religious freedom should not be surprising. Pope Pius XI noted the fact in 1931 when he said that the language of religious freedom was equivocal (i.e., it has multiple meanings). He said:
Liberty of conscience… is an equivocal expression [which is] too often distorted to mean the absolute independence of conscience. (Non Abbiamo Bisogno 41)
As there are two different versions of religious freedom, then that means that there is not a contradiction when one version was rejected by Mirari Vos, and a different version was approved by Vatican II. (For further details on the different versions, see “Did Vatican II Reject Pope Leo XIII’s Doctrine of Religious Freedom?”)
5. Separation of Church and State
Pope Gregory XVI’s encyclical also rejected the idea of the separation of Church and State. It said:
Nor can We predict happier times for religion and government from the plans of those who desire vehemently to separate the Church from the State, and to break the mutual concord between temporal authority and the priesthood. It is certain that that concord which always was favorable and beneficial for the sacred and the civil order is feared by the shameless lovers of liberty. (Mirari Vos 20)
Although Lammenais linked the topics of religious freedom and the separation of Church and State, strictly speaking those topics involve separate sets of issues. A commitment to religious freedom does not automatically involve a separation of Church and State. For example, in the modern United Kingdom there is religious freedom, as well as an established Church (which is the official State Religion).
When we look at what Vatican II said about the Church and State, we can see that it does not call for, or endorse, a separation of Church and State. (See “Did Vatican II Change Doctrine About the Separation of Church and State?”)
This means that Pope Gregory XVI’s comments about the separation of Church and State are not relevant to the specific issue of Vatican II’s declaration of religious freedom.
6. Conclusion
There is no contradiction between Pope Gregory XVI’s 1832 Mirari Vos and Vatican II’s 1965 Dignitatis Humanae. This is because Vatican II approved a LIMITED religious freedom, and Pope Gregory XVI rejected an EXTREME religious freedom. (See section 4.)
Those documents only contradict each other if it is assumed that they are approving and rejecting the same single (univocal) concept of religious freedom. But, as we saw above, Pope Pius XI warned in 1931 that the concept is equivocal (i.e., it has multiple meanings). That means that it is a false (fallacious) conclusion to claim a contradiction, because that conclusion is based upon reading equivocal language as if it is univocal.
However, some members of the Church may disagree and insist that there is (somehow) still a contradiction between Mirari Vos and Vatican II. That raises a question about how members of the Church should solve theological disagreements.
The Church’s traditional methodology for solving theological disagreements is the doctrine of the living magisterium. (See “What Is the Living Magisterium?”) That doctrine teaches that when there is a disagreement which can damage Church unity, then matters should be referred to the current pope for resolution, in order to avoid disagreements spiraling into disunity.
Elements of that methodology can be seen in Pope Gregory XVI’s encyclical Mirari Vos, especially where he said:
The Roman Pontiff… He alone, and no private person, can decide anything “about the rules of the Church Fathers.” (Mirari Vos 10)
What this all points to is a twofold conclusion. Firstly, there is no contradiction between Vatican II and Mirari Vos. Secondly, if any member of the Church disagrees whether there is a contradiction, then the Church’s tradition provides a simple methodology for resolving matters in a way which preserves Church unity.
