Is Tolerance Tolerant?

In an increasingly fractious world, we often hear appeals for tolerance. It is assumed that tolerance has an obvious rightness: and so no sane or healthy person could ever doubt the idea of being tolerant. 

But there is a problem. There are different models of tolerance and those different models have very different implications for individuals and societies. Some of those implications are so problematic that they begin to raise questions about how tolerant tolerance might actually be.

Tolerance as a Judgement

The classic model of tolerance in medieval writers like St Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), is a judgement model. Aquinas defined it as essentially a putting-up with evil because it has been judged that eradicating the evil would lead to a worse evil or the loss of a good (Summa Theologiae 2-2 q.10 a.11). 

The paradigmatic example of theological tolerance is the problem of evil. In this problem, God tolerates the existence of evil in the world, as a necessary condition for other goods such as human free will. If people are genuinely free, then that means that they must be able to do evil. So, God tolerates the existence of human evil as an unavoidable consequence of having the good of human free choice. 

Tolerance as a judgement is essentially the model we find in Enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke’s (1632-1704) Letter Concerning Toleration (1689). In the aftermath of the Reformation, Europe was riven by the rage of religious and political wars. Some estimates conclude that more than a million people lost their lives. In such a context, Locke concluded that even if you judge other people’s views as wrong or evil, it is still better to tolerate those views rather than keep fighting and killing each other over the issues.

There are of course limits to what should be tolerated. Jesus modelled the limits of tolerance when he expelled the bankers from the temple (Mark 11, 15). Doctrines like the Just War model the limits of tolerance for ‘turning the other cheek.’ Common sense also tells us that there must be limits to toleration. Should children be expected to tolerate the evil of abuse? Should battered spouses be expected to tolerate the evil of assault? Of course not.

When Locke reflected on where to draw the limits of toleration he focused on the criterion of public peace. Toleration is a matter of putting up with views which we may find distasteful, objectionable or even ‘evil,’ in order to eradicate avoidable violence and conflict. For Locke, this meant that it was Roman Catholics who were beyond the limits of toleration. They had supported the 1588 Spanish Armada, which had tried to remove the Protestant English head of state. They had supported the 1605 Gunpowder Plot, which had tried to blow up the Protestant legislature. Catholics were just too dangerous to be tolerated.

Even amongst those who agree, in principle, that toleration is a good idea; it has always proved much harder to agree where the limits of toleration should be set. Should an entire faith be demonised because of the actions of extremists? It was a discussion point in the Seventeenth Century and it remained a discussion point in the aftermath of the 2001 September 11th attacks.

Even when it could be agreed that a practice like a human sacrifice made a religious extremist and dangerous, the question of toleration still arose. Witnessing the rapacious cruelty of the European armies in the Americas, Bartolomeo de La Casas stood up at the Valladolid Debate (1550) and asked whether even the evils of human sacrifice shouldn’t be tolerated, at least for a while, rather than inflicting the worse evil of a genocidal conquest.

Historically, disagreements about the limits of toleration have not always been confined to issues of violence and public safety. For example, St Augustine (354-430) and St Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) suggested that prostitution should be tolerated within the context of the Medieval state (Sum Theol 2-2 Q.10 a.11). In the Twentieth Century, academics in France even campaigned for an end to laws preventing Paedophilia (1977), on the basis that such laws were unfairly intolerant.

People can and do disagree about where the limits of toleration should be set. However, in a judgement model of tolerance people can advance evidence and argument to debate judgements about what should be tolerated, and where tolerance should be limited. For example, part of what it means to talk about a tolerance like freedom of speech is an understanding of the limits of tolerance implied by a ban on libel.  

Ultimately the classic ‘judgement’ model of toleration is focused upon the public good, not individuals’ feelings. It tries to ensure the best (or the least bad) balance which preserves public goods and avoids public evils. This means that tolerance of free speech does not ban libel because libel hurts people’s feelings. It bans libel because libel destroys public and professional relationships, thus undermining the public good. 

Tolerance as Feelings

A feelings model of toleration is radically different from the judgement model. It is essentially a model of kindness which tries to define the limits of toleration in terms of protecting people’s feelings. As one of the things which can upset people’s feelings is being judgemental, this means that a feelings model of tolerance typically tries to be non-judgemental.

In a non-judgemental world people cannot describe an opposing view as an ‘evil,’ a ‘wrongness,’ or even as something which is ‘objectionable.’ All those descriptions imply judgements. In order to eradicate the idea of judgement, the concept of tolerance has to be turned into a completely subjective idea, which makes it about the inner feelings which it leads to, like feeling uncomfortable. 

However, if you feel uncomfortable people can still ask about why you are uncomfortable. If you are uncomfortable about something which cannot be judged as objectionable, then being uncomfortable starts to seem like an irrationality or a discriminatory disrespect. It invites the question of whether you just need to get over your unreasonable uncomfortable-ness.

Once being uncomfortable looks unreasonable, then the next step is to conclude that toleration itself is an inappropriate attitude. Why are you feeling uncomfortable and merely tolerating something, when there is nothing wrong with it? Rather than projecting your uncomfortableness onto others, by merely tolerating an opposing view; you should be positive and accept and support the other view. This way of thinking leads inexorably to the conclusion that if you believe in a non-judgemental tolerance, then tolerance is just not good enough. True tolerance rejects being merely tolerant.

This is a bizarre conclusion and leads to impossible implications. If toleration means accepting other people’s views and if people have conflicting views, then it seems to imply that you would have to both accept and not-accept conflicting views on capital punishment, gun control, abortion, etc. 

As it is impossible to accept every conflicting view, proponents of a feelings model of tolerance tend to end up insisting that you should change your (intolerant) view to accept their view. However, there cannot be any argument or discussion about it, as that would imply comparisons and… judgement.

When two people with opposing views each try to apply this feelings model of tolerance, they end up effectively squaring up and shouting at each other. They are not able to discuss or explain their different views. All they can do is insist that opponents get over any feelings of uncomfortableness which they have, and just adopt the opposing view. When each side is convinced that they are right and that the other side should adopt their view, this understandably leads to frustration, anger and conflict.

Ultimately, advocates of a feelings model of tolerance may be using the word ‘tolerance,’ but its application has ended up creating the very conflict and intolerance which the original judgement model of tolerance was intended to avoid.

The reason why the feelings model struggles is explained in Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (Pope Benedict XVI)’s 2004 book, Truth and Tolerance. In that book, he makes the point that we cannot understand and apply the idea of tolerance unless we are prepared to do significant intellectual work clarifying what we mean by truth, goodness and justice. However, this means exploring different perspectives and then drawing conclusions and making the judgements which are rejected by the feelings model of tolerance.

The attempt to be non-judgemental seems well-intentioned, but it creates a model of tolerance which seems to achieve the opposite of what it intends. The judgement model of tolerance allowed for evidence and argument, with judges making objective judgements to arbitrate differences of view about what should count as tolerance or intolerance. When inner feelings become the focus of tolerance, evidence, and argument give way to subjective experiences. Intolerance ceases to be measured by its objective impact, but it is instead measured by feelings of ‘hate’ and ‘phobia.’ Unfortunately, feelings are essentially private experiences, which are not accessible to judges in the way that evidence and argument is. This means that a feelings model of tolerance becomes extremely difficult for judges to apply in a fair and consistent way. When justice itself struggles to be seen to be fair, something very serious has gone wrong.

Ultimately the feelings model of tolerance sets out with the laudable aim of improving the classic judgement model of tolerance, by extending it to include people’s feelings. Sadly, trying to make tolerance focus on kindness, ends up undermining the very concept and application of tolerance, leading to potentially intolerant outcomes. By trying to make ‘tolerance’ do more, the feelings model of tolerance risks ending up with a tolerance which does far less.