Did Vatican II Reject the Confessional State or the State’s Duty to Care for Religion? (Part III)

Previously, we explored the question of whether prior to Vatican II there was a doctrine that nation states must confess the faith. (See Part I.) We also explored whether there was a doctrine that nation states must “care for religion.” (See Part II.) We saw that the Church did indeed have a tradition of teaching both of those points.

To simplify language in what follows I will combine those two ideas and refer to them as simply a doctrine of states’ religious duties.

In this Part III we now ask whether Vatican II rejected the doctrine of states’ religious duties, either by explicitly denying it, or by affirming something else that was logically inconsistent with it.

1. Vatican II on the Moral Duty of Societies

The argument that Vatican II did not change prior Church teaching about states’ religious duties often appeals to the following text from Dignitatis Humanae (DH):

[The declaration] leaves untouched traditional Catholic doctrine on the moral duty of men and societies toward the… Church. (DH 1)

On the surface that sentence seems to be a clear and unambiguous warning not to misinterpret Dignitatis Humanae as if it had changed prior doctrines, such as states’ religious duties.

However, some people say that the Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC) has authoritatively interpreted that sentence as effectively having nothing to do with states’ religious duties. The Catechism says:

This is “the traditional Catholic teaching on the moral duty of individuals and societies toward the true religion and the one Church of Christ.” … [It is] the social duty of Christians… to respect and awaken in each man the love of the true and the good. (CCC 2105)

Although the Catechism interprets the sentence (above) in a minimalist way, it does not rule out that the sentence should also be understood as claiming more.

There are two reasons for thinking that it does indeed assert more.

Firstly, we know that the sentence was added very late to Dignitatis Humanae, at the direct request of Pope Paul VI. Its purpose was to reassure bishops that there was no change in previous Church teaching on precisely the matter of states’ religious duties. That issue of doctrinal continuity was noted contemporaneously in 1966 by Joseph Ratzinger, who said that

the text attempts to emphasize continuity in the statements of the official Church. (Theological Highlights of Vatican II, Session 4)

The words would not have achieved their purpose if they were only to be interpreted in the minimalist sense conveyed by the later Catechism.

A second reason for interpreting the sentence as reassuring bishops that there was no doctrinal change is provided by Bishop Émile-Joseph De Smedt. He was the spokesman for the committee which drafted Dignitatis Humanae. Dealing with a query from one of the bishops at Vatican II he said that the document:

did not overlook or deny Pope Leo XIII’s teaching about the responsibility of the state to profess the true religion. (See “The End of the Catholic State.”)

If the official advice to the bishops voting on the text of Dignitatis Humanae was assuring them that the text of the document did not “overlook or deny” Pope Leo XIII’s teachings that the state did indeed have religious duties, then it would be a very odd interpretation to claim that the sentence making that very point, does not actually do so.

2. Religious Freedom and Confessional States

On the specific issue of confessional states, some people have claimed that Vatican II’s acceptance of religious freedom must somehow contradict or automatically reject the idea of a confessional state. (See “A life for Christ the King: Archbishop Lefebvre.”)

But that reasoning is based on the mistaken assumption that approving religious freedom means approving indifferentism, which is inconsistent with a confessional state. However, we know that Vatican II rejected indifferentism. So, the Council’s approval of religious freedom has no logical implications for its view of a confessional state.

The Council even obliquely acknowledged that religious freedom can be logically compatible with a confessional state, when it said:

If… special civil recognition is given to one religious community… it is at the same time imperative that the right of all citizens and religious communities to religious freedom should be recognized. (DH 6)

We can see a modern type of that compatibility in the way that the Church of England celebrates National Services of Thanksgiving on behalf of the UK State. Examples of church events include services at the end of wars, such as the Falklands War of 1982; as well as celebrations for anniversaries of the head of state, such as the Platinum Royal Jubilee in 2022.

The UK example was explicitly raised on the floor of Vatican II. Bishop John Wright of Pittsburgh said on 28 September 1964:

Religious liberty can be worked out even in a state favoring some particular religion… as it does in England, where a Protestant church… traditionally enjoys special privileges but where now… all… have religious liberty. (Third Session Council Speeches of Vatican II, Chap 17)

What these comments show is that there is no reason to think that Vatican II’s approval of religious freedom has any logical implications which would be inconsistent with a doctrine of a confessional state.

3. Religious Freedom and Caring for Religion

On the specific issue of caring for religion Dignitatis Humanae does in fact say that governments have a responsibility to favor religion. It states:

Government… ought indeed to take account of the religious life of the citizenry and show it favor. (DH 3)

Government is also to help create conditions favorable to the fostering of religious life, in order that the people may be truly enabled to… fulfill their religious duties. (DH 6)

It is open to debate about what exactly Dignitatis Humanae meant by favoring religion. But some aspects of its implications are spelled out in the following claims:

The function of government is to make provision for the common welfare [bonum commune]. (DH 3)

It is the special duty of government to provide… a proper guardianship of public morality. (DH 7)

As it happens, those two claims broadly sum up the heart of the rationale of the pre-Vatican II doctrine about states’ religious duties. States had religious duties precisely because those duties promoted the common good, and those duties arose as an expression of the moral obligations within natural law. (See texts cited in Part II.)

To recognize that those two sentences are consistent with pre-Vatican II doctrine does not mean that those sentences are reaffirming that doctrine. But what consistency does show is that the Council is not rejecting the prior doctrine.

4. Vatican II and Concordats

Another type of argument claims that Vatican II must have rejected the idea of states’ religious duties, as Vatican diplomats changed Church concordats after Vatican II, and the diplomats specifically removed the idea of states’ religious duties from them. (See Marcel Lefebvre’s view in They Have Uncrowned Him, Chap 25.)

Diplomatic changes to concordats after Vatican II took place to incorporate the idea of religious freedom. If Vatican diplomats also removed other ideas from concordats, those (later) actions are hardly a proof of the existence of an (earlier) Vatican II rejection of states’ religious duties. Diplomats may have had other reasons for removing references to states’ religious duties (as we will see in section 7 below).

In any case, it would be a mistake to think that all ideas associated with states’ religious duties have indeed been removed from all legal documents, especially from state constitutions.

The 2011 version of the Constitution of Costa Rica states:

The Roman, Catholic, Apostolic Religion is that of the State, which contributes to its maintenance, without preventing the free exercise in the Republic of other beliefs that do not oppose themselves to the universal morality or good customs. (Constitution, Article 75)

The 2016 revision of the Malta constitution states:

The religion of Malta is the Roman Catholic Apostolic Religion. The authorities of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church have the duty and the right to teach which principles are right and which are wrong. Religious teaching of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Faith shall be provided in all State schools as part of compulsory education. (Constitution, Chapter 2, 1–3)

Both constitutions restate principles which used to be part of the understanding of the pre-Vatican II doctrine of states’ religious duties. Thus, Costa Rica “contributes to the maintenance” of the faith, and Malta provides Church teaching in state schools. Both of those state constitutions were agreed in consultation with representatives of the Church. Why would the Church agree to such language in the twenty-first century if Vatican II had in fact changed the Church’s doctrine in 1965?

5. Pope Paul VI on Freedom

Another argument claims that Pope Paul VI’s closing speech proves that the Church changed its teaching on states’ religious duties. Paul VI said to representatives of governments:

What does the Church ask of you today? She tells you in one of the major documents of this council. She asks of you only liberty, the liberty to believe and to preach her faith, the freedom to love her God and serve Him, the freedom to live and to bring to men her message of life. (Address, 8 December 1965)

If the Church asks governments only to give it freedom, then that raises the question of whether the Church has abandoned its previous teaching of states’ religious duties.

However, it would be misleading to interpret Pope Paul VI’s words simplistically. Vatican II actually asks far more of governments than freedom. The conciliar document which asks for freedom (Dignitatis Humanae) also tells governments that they have specific moral obligations. (See texts in section 3 above.) Other conciliar documents provide explicit lists of morally unacceptable actions, which are no less obligatory for governments than they are for citizens. (See Gaudium et Spes 27.)

If we bear in mind that the pre-Vatican II doctrine of states’ religious duties was understood to be a moral obligation arising from natural law, then in so far as Paul VI’s words above are consistent with governments having the additional moral responsibilities which Vatican II says that they have; then those words must also be consistent with governments having religious duties which arise as moral obligations from natural law. So, whatever point Pope Paul VI was trying to make, his words cannot be inconsistent with the existence of a doctrine of states’ religious duties.

6. Lex Orandi, Lex Credendi

Some people claim that there is a liturgical reason to think that Vatican II changed the doctrine of states’ religious duties. This argument is based upon the fact that certain prayers and hymns in the office of Christ the King were changed after Vatican II. (See Michael Davies, The Second Vatican Council and Religious Liberty, Chap 25.)

Those liturgical changes removed references to aspects of states’ religious duties. One example occurs in the hymn “Thou, Prince of All Ages” (Te Saeculorum Principem) where the old verse 6 (beginning Te nationum praesides…) was removed in 1970. (Compare the old version of the hymn with the new version.)

The liturgical argument concludes: why would the Church be changing its prayers if it hasn’t changed its doctrine?

But this argument is potentially misleading as it relates primarily to the Roman Rite. When groups in the Church who have traditionally had their own rite (such as the Dominicans) celebrate the office in Latin, they can use their older liturgical books which have the original versions of hymns and prayers.

It is also the case that liturgical changes occur for a wide range of reasons which are not necessarily related to doctrine. (See for example the Good Friday prayer for the Jews.)

7. The Changing State

In sections 4, 5 and 6 (above) it was suggested that there can be non-doctrinal reasons for why the Church might want to avoid aspects of its previous language about states’ religious duties. In this section we will briefly note a possible example of such a reason, which arises from a problem within the philosophy of politics.

In his 1951 book Man and the State, Jacques Maritain noted that there were two distinct types of political state.

The substantialist state was a medieval political entity that was identified with an individual, like a king. The acts of the king were the acts of the state. This position is illustrated by King Louis XIV’s alleged 1655 comment that “I am the state” (L’État, c’est moi).

The representative (or instrumentalist) state is a modern political entity. The state exists as a political reality with delegated responsibilities from the citizens. No specific individual “is” the state.

Under the substantialist state it is obvious who is the subject of the responsibility for the state’s religious duties. It is the monarch. Consequently, if the state falls short in relation to its religious duties, then it is the monarch who sins.

But who is the subject of the responsibility of religious duties in a representative state which has delegated responsibilities from citizens? Many religious responsibilities cannot be delegated (e.g. like Sunday Mass obligation). Can a population delegate a responsibility to “confess the faith”? And in a pluralist state who would (Catholic) religious responsibilities be delegated to? Is it the head of state, who may not even be a Catholic?

Those kinds of questions raise complicated philosophical problems about moral responsibilities. Until they are resolved, the Church is arguably not in a position to preach a doctrine of a state’s religious duties.

Could Maritain’s philosophical problem really be a reason why Vatican II did not reaffirm the doctrine of a states’ religious duties?

We know that Maritain was widely read by the bishops who attended Vatican II. His book, Man and the State, went through 12 printings between 1951 and 1966. He also had a close personal friendship with Pope Paul VI, who even described him as “my teacher.”

But ultimately there is no actual evidence that Maritain’s thinking influenced Vatican II. The reason for raising Maritain’s problem is not to argue that it influenced Vatican II. It is rather to illustrate that there were indeed non-doctrinal reasons in 1965 for why the bishops at Vatican II might have wanted to avoid reaffirming the traditional doctrine of the states’ religious duties.

The existence of such reasons means that Vatican II’s silence on the matter of the states’ religious duties cannot be interpreted as if it amounts to (or logically entails) a rejection of the doctrine of states’ religious duties.

8. Integralism

The doctrine that states have religious duties is sometimes called Integralism. There is a contemporary debate about integralism, with supporters (such as Thomas Pink, Joseph Trabbic, Adrian Vermeule and Edmund Waldstein) and with critics (such as F. Russell Hittinger, Robert Miller, John Courtney Murray and Scott Roniger).

Sometimes anti-integralists appeal to post-Vatican II papal teaching. For example, in 1988 Pope John Paul II said:

Religious integralism, which makes no distinction between the proper spheres of faith and civil life, which is still practised in other parts of the world, seems to be incompatible with the very spirit of Europe, as it has been shaped by the Christian message. (Speech to the European Parliament, 11 October 1988, #10)

Those words involve a rejection of one version of integralism, which merges church and state. But there is nothing new in rejecting an integralism that merges and confuses powers, as Pope Leo XIII said something similar in 1885 (Immortale Dei 13).

Another comment cited by anti-integralists is Pope Francis’s 2016 comment that:

States must be secular. Confessional states end badly. (Interview, 9 May 2016)

That seems on the surface to be a blunt rejection of integralism. But matters are more complex. We saw above that the doctrine of confessional states was developed in the context of substantialist states, and substantialist states are led by monarchs or dictators (section 7). History shows that dictator-led states do generally end badly. So, there is a very real sense in which Pope Francis’ comments are accurate, even though they don’t actually address the deeper question of whether there could be a confessional state that exists in a representative state.

What this all means is that the existence of the ongoing debate about integralism, and the existence of papal comments on the matter, do not resolve the contemporary theological question of whether, and to what extent, representative states can or should follow a doctrine of states’ religious duties. The fact that these issues are still being debated today, shows that Vatican II cannot have resolved the issue in 1965.

9. Conclusion

Prior to Vatican II the Church developed a doctrine of states’ religious duties, which said that (ideally) states should be confessional (see Part I) and that they should care for religion (see Part II).

Vatican II did not reject that doctrine. (See sections 1–6.) But nor did it reaffirm the doctrine. That failure to reaffirm should not be interpreted as if it is a rejection, because there are valid reasons for the Council to maintain a prudential silence on the matter. (See section 7.) The fact that there is an ongoing debate about integralism confirms that these issues remain unresolved, even today. (See section 8.)

One of the implications of this conclusion is that it means that critics of Vatican II should not cite the Council’s views on the issue of states’ religious duties, as a putative reason for rejecting the orthodoxy of the Council. If Vatican II did not teach on the issue of states’ religious duties, then it is (logically) impossible for the Council to have provided erroneous teaching on the matter.