Modern Physics, New Atheists, Ancient Greeks

Bob Drury - Intelligibility

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The physicist, Stephen M. Barr, has addressed the question of whether quantum physics makes it easier to believe in God. He has answered that it has, but only indirectly, in that quantum physics falsifies the philosophy of materialism, which is the basis of the belief in atheism of many moderns. Barr notes that the fundamental equations of modern physics are wave functions and as such are inherently probabilistic. They express partial certitude, because they are not uniquely predictive. Partial certitude is a characteristic of mind, not matter. Thus, quantum physics is incompatible with the philosophy of materialism.

Granting that Barr’s argument is valid, it would not be persuasive to me, if I were a materialist. I would object that the same argument could be made, if the fundamental equations of physics were uniquely predictive and not probabilistic. One could claim that such equations falsify materialism because prediction is a characteristic of mind, not matter. As a materialist I would claim that Barr was merely analyzing the conventions of vocabulary and not discussing material reality. As a materialist, I would claim that the physicist’s contemplation of his probabilistic or his predictive equations was simply material activity in his brain, not differing in any essential way from the activity within the brain of a six-month old infant forming the concept, Mama.

However, I believe that the problem in modern physics, cited by Barr, could be crucial to the materialist’s reconsideration of his philosophy, persuading him to abandon it. That problem in modern physics is an age-old problem that may never be solved in any of its many contexts with complete satisfaction. It is the problem of how to reconcile the continuous (in modern physics: the fundamental wave function) with the discrete (in modern physics: its ‘collapse’ into a quantum result).

In ancient Greece, the context of the dilemma of reconciling the continuous with the discrete was the context of motion or change. Motion and change are continuous, but location and the object of change are discrete. Heraclitus claimed that change is reality, thereby relegating discrete things in place, as the objects of change, to the set of logical constructs. On the other hand, Zeno proved by discrete analysis that motion was impossible and therefore that motion was merely an illusion. Although we may dismiss these ancient Greeks as amateurs, we cannot deny that modern physicists, like the ancient Greeks, have not solved the dilemma. In ancient Greece and in modern physics the apparent dilemma of reconciling the continuous and the discrete was and is thought to be a problem within material reality. However, the problem is purely logical. It is not a problem of being. It is based on the logical distinction between two different conceptual perspectives.

Another dilemma faced by the ancient Greeks was how to reconcile the materiality and particularity of material things on the one hand and the universality and intelligibility of concepts of material things on the other. The atomists or materialists decided that reality was only material. The realists or Platonists took the opposing view, that the really real were intelligible concepts in themselves. They viewed the material as some strange, particular shadow of the intelligible universals. It was Aristotle who proposed that material reality was inherently intelligible in itself. Material things were composites of a principle of particularity (matter) and a principle of universality and intelligibility (form). Further, the human mind had the ability to derive the intelligible principle from the material knowledge of sensation.

In a review of the work of the ancient Greeks on the continuous vs. the discrete and on the material vs. the intelligible, modern materialists might hopefully realize they are still riding on wheels that were outdated, not since the days of Goodyear, but since the days of Aristotle. I believe that such a review could dissuade a modern materialist from materialism. In contrast, I see little power to dissuade in the claim that the wave functions of modern physics express partial certitude and therefore imply mind.

Another argument based on modern physics, which is said to falsify materialism, is that the observation of the outcome of the collapsing wave function, as observation, implies mind. However, to go that far down the road of science to modern physics without noting that all science involves measurement, i.e. observation, makes no sense. How can anyone be that far down a road before he questions the very possibility of going down that road? It makes sense to look for mathematical relationships among the measurements of the properties of material things, but only if material reality is intelligible in itself. That material reality is intelligible in itself is a necessary realization before the first rudimentary measurement of science is made.

It was the common acceptance of the inherent intelligibility of material reality which spurred scientific measurement. In his Regensburg address, Benedict XVI attributed the flourishing of western civilization with its emphasis on the intelligibility of material reality to the confluence of Greek philosophy and the Judeo-Christian revelation. That revelation was of the infinitely intelligent, personal Word of God and his intelligible, material creation. Benedict then traced the trend to de-emphasize the intellect in favor of the will as leading to the current degradation of western thought and civilization. He named the trend toward anti-intelligibility, the ‘dehellenization’ of western thought. This trend toward denying the intelligibility of material reality can be seen in imputing the indeterminacy and uncertainty of modern physics to material reality rather than to the limits of instrumentation and to the limits of human understanding. We prefer to impute unintelligibility to reality than to admit human ignorance.

Further, one cannot expect to find some fundamental unifying equation in the measurement of properties. The measurement of particular properties is essentially one of perspective, which is differential not unitive. The properties of things derive any semblance of unity from the unity of the material being of which they are the properties. The perspective-ness of science contrasted to the unity of being, perceived philosophically, is poetically presented in an old song. The words are, “Inchworm, inchworm measuring the marigolds. You and your arithmetic, you’ll probably go far”. The mathematical measurements of science are fascinating and, through technology, are awesome. However, they necessarily miss the principle of unity, which is the being whose properties are subject to measurement. In the song, the principle of unity, the being, is the marigold.

The physicist, Alexander Sich, prosaically noted the divergence in the objectives of science and philosophy, which are contrasted by the song. The validity of the mathematical equations representing the measurable properties of things does “not imbue mathematics with the ability to impart ontological status”. The study of what is measurable, using mathematics, is not the study of being. Sich quotes several academics, who amusingly fail to distinguish mathematical thought from material reality (video of the Science and Faith Conference in 2011, at 1:05). For a parallel comic routine involving neuroscientists, see \”Neuroscientists Scooped by the Catholic Church.\”

Among the new atheists, Sam Harris with his interest in neuroscience may be a materialist. However, the author of The God Delusion, Richard Dawkins, is quite definitely not a materialist. He is a relativist who distinctly characterizes matter as irrational in itself and only informed with intelligibility in human artifacts. For Dawkins, the source of intelligibility is the individual human mind. According to Dawkins it is a mistake to see any equivalence between material complexity and human artifice. For Dawkins that mistake yields the error of thinking that material reality is intelligible, when, in fact, design (intelligibility) in material reality, except for human artifice, is an illusion.

Aristotle, St. Thomas and Richard Dawkins all agree that matter is devoid of intelligibility. Of the trio, only Dawkins believes that material reality is devoid of intelligibility. Dawkins’ beliefs lead to relativism and atheism, but not materialism. Dawkins is an idealist in the mode of Kant where the source of intelligibility is the human mind.

The philosophical questions facing the ancient Greeks are the same questions facing modern man, as well as all men of all time. The perennial philosophy of the ancient Greeks and the medieval scholastics justifies experimental science by recognizing the intelligibility of material reality. In a review of modern (and, in fact, perennial) questions in light of that philosophy, a modern atheist, whether materialist or relativist, might find reason to change his mind. It is the perennial philosophy which undergirds and defends science from the current philosophies based on the anti-intelligibility of material reality. Western civilization received its cultural identity through the evangelization flowing from the confluence of Greek philosophy and the Judeo-Christian revelation. We should anticipate that the Catholic re-evangelization of the West will go hand in hand with its re-hellenization, jointly restoring honor to the inherent intelligibility of material reality and to the Word.

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12 thoughts on “Modern Physics, New Atheists, Ancient Greeks”

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  2. Could the Incarnation be seen as the reconciliation of ideal and particular?

    The eulogy for St. Ignatius was given by a Jesuit friend of his, who in that eulogy characterized the divine nature by using the phrase non coerci maximo, contineri tamen a minimo [not constrained by the largest (eternal, ideal), yet contained in the smallest (particular, material)].

    Probably a dumb non sequitur on my part but it made me smile to read your piece after reading the eulogy of St. Ignatius!

  3. “The validity of the mathematical equations representing the measurable properties of things does “not imbue mathematics with the ability to impart ontological status”. The study of what is measurable, using mathematics, is not the study of being. Sich quotes several academics, who amusingly fail to distinguish mathematical thought from material reality (video of the Science and Faith Conference in 2011, at 1:05). ”

    Great!!!
    Thanks for a fine post.
    Bob Kurland

  4. To sort out much of the confusion you might consider Bishop Berkeley’s work, Of the Principles of Human Knowledge. He provides insight into the view that stands in opposition to materialism, putting forth Idealism as the correct philosophy when it comes to both reality and faith.

    1. Cardinal Newman said in Apologia Pro Vita Sua that he saw the world in Bishop Berkeley’s terms. This has always fascinated me. Cardinal Newman said — if I recall the wording — that Berkeley’s work shows how the world as we perceive it has a sacramental character, always the character of an outward sign pointing toward an inner grace.

    2. Jeff, wonderful insight! I will look that up.

      Berkeley has been overlooked primarily because his work was difficult to understand for those wedded to materialism and realism.

      Berkeley correctly makes the point in the work mentioned above, that this philosophy was the only one consistent with faith. I believe that is the case. To see it in sacramental terms is off-the-charts brilliant.

  5. ” As a materialist, I would claim that the physicist’s contemplation of his probabilistic or his predictive equations was simply material activity in his brain, not differing in any essential way from the activity within the brain of a six-month old infant forming the concept, Mama.”

    I think you meant that to be a dismissive statement, but the truth is that little if any physics is really as impressive as the amazing learning done by six-month-old infants. I say that as a physicist myself.

    1. Also, for the record, I am a Catholic, not a materialist. I just think your example was particularly poorly chosen.

    2. Of course it was meant to be dismissive of the argument that a lack of certitude should be more convincing of the non-materiality of human
      intellectual acts than some other characteristic of intellectual knowledge. It was not dismissive of physics or of the intellectual power of physicists or of infants. I am more impressed with the commonality of the intellectual acts of all humans than with their differences, however great those differences may be. Noting the commonality of the intellectual activity of children and scientists is a favorite way of mine of stressing the fundamental characteristics of human thought (See essay on page 23, http://deltaepsilonsigma.org/media/delta-epsilon-sigma/Volume-LVIII-Spring2013-Number1.pdf). I used this same tack in the CatholicStand essay, as if I were a materialist.

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