What Has Philosophy to Do With Religion?

Over the centuries people have often asked whether philosophy has any place in religion. Sometimes philosophy has been rejected as a distraction. On other occasions it has been treated as indispensable.

One of the reasons for this difference is that it is not always clear to religious people when their thinking is being influenced by philosophical assumptions. To see how this can arise, we are going to start by asking what religion is “for”?

Religion

Religions are complex sociological and cultural phenomena which fulfill multiple roles and purposes. However, there are two aspects which are particularly significant:

• Firstly, religions tend to be a source of additional information, which supplements the information available from the physical senses.
• Secondly, religions spell out implications for human relationships, which go beyond what people could typically work out for themselves.

Of course, there is a lot more to a religion than just transmitting information and developing relationships. But these two aspects are a minimal feature which can be seen widely in world religions. Most religions have a revelation of some sort, which informs an ethics or spirituality.

Religions express themselves in a wide range of ways. But the focus of religious ethics is usually a matter of achieving “goodness” (or “holiness”). So, at the risk of oversimplifying, we can say that religions exist to enable people to become “good.”

Goodness

At the heart of considerations about goodness is the philosophical problem known as the Euthyphro Dilemma. It forces religions to make a choice between two competing models of goodness. It asks whether God says that something is good because it is good; or is something good just because God says so.

The first option is a “reality” model of goodness. It claims that the nature of reality determines whether acts are good or bad. For example, murder is wrong because the nature of human beings means that taking innocent life is morally wrong. Reality models of goodness typically lead to Natural Law models of ethics.

The problem with reality models is that they can seem to constrain God’s freedom and power. If goodness is determined by reality, and the created reality is separate to God, then goodness seems to be greater than God. This means that God is forced to conform to the standards of an external goodness.

The alternative fork of the Euthyphro dilemma is a “Will” based model of goodness. It maximizes God’s freedom by insisting that goodness is whatever God wills it to be. Murder is wrong purely because God (currently) commands it as forbidden. This approach leads to Divine Command models of ethics.

“Will” models can seem an attractive way of interpreting bible stories such as God commanding Abraham to murder his son (Genesis 22:2). But they turn religion into a cult of a dictator. Religious membership becomes analogous to gang membership. Followers obey the Deity Don’s decrees because the consequences of disobedience are too dire to contemplate.

To avoid the (moral) problems of a Divine Command ethics, St. Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) insisted that God is not choosing what is right and wrong. In stories like Abraham and Isaac, it is the contextual “reality” of Natural Law which determines what God is commanding. Although that may make it look like the reality of nature is superior to God, this is not the case because God has freely chosen to create the world (Summa Theologiae Part 2-1 Q.93). Having (freely) made that choice then yes, even God is constrained by the implications of that choice, but they are limitations freely chosen by God (i.e., not imposed on God).

The Euthyphro dilemma is important because it is a subtle philosophical issue which religious people must take a view on. Often religious people do not realize that their views about God and goodness involve a philosophical choice. People may even assume that one fork of the dilemma is “obviously” right, or that it is “obviously” taught by Scripture, without realizing that there is an alternative philosophical choice.

Faith

There is an enormous diversity of views about the nature of religious faith. However, an important set of differences emerge as affinities to the two different models of goodness.

If a religion thinks that goodness is determined by reality (e.g., Natural Law ethics) then understanding reality becomes particularly important, as do beliefs about the nature of reality. This leads to emphasizing a model of faith which sees it as an intellectual acceptance of belief claims. This can be seen in the Catechism of the Catholic Church which states: “Faith… involves an assent of the intellect…” (CCC 176).

However, if a religion takes a Will approach to goodness (e.g., Divine Command ethics), then a different model of faith may emerge. In the face of God’s commands, followers must show obedience and loyalty, trusting their God. So, religious faith becomes a type of confidence and trust in God.

The models of believing faith and trusting faith are not exclusive. Nor are they logically entailed by either of the models of goodness (or their ethics). However, there is an affinity between models of Reality goodness, Natural Law and believing faith. And there is a different affinity between Will goodness, Divine Command Ethics and trusting faith.

We can see these affinities at work in some of the sixteenth-century Reformation disputes. Christians with a Natural Law emphasis often insisted that the Bible taught a belief model of faith. Christians with a Divine Command ethic insisted that the Bible taught a trust model of faith.

Each approach insisted that their model of faith was the correct interpretation of the Bible. Less often was it appreciated that their religious interpretations of Scripture may have been subtly influenced by (philosophical) preferences for specific horns of the Euthyphro dilemma.

Truth

The two different models of goodness and faith create affinities towards two different models of truth.

Those who look to reality for their model of goodness, and hold a belief model of faith, will typically value and emphasize beliefs about reality. People express their beliefs in claims, which acquire meaning because of the rational relationships with each other.

This leads to a model of (rational) truth which balances faith and reason in a single coherent synthesis of rationality, with a sharp delineation between what is “true” and what is “false.” One of the clearest expressions of this model is St. Pope John Paul II’s 1998 Encyclical: Fides et Ratio.

Those who believe in a Divine Command ethic and a trust model of faith will typically be less interested in questions about the nature of reality. What is important is the interpretation of God’s commands. Analyzing commands generally leads to a realization that more than one interpretation, or application is possible; and so rival “schools” of interpretation arise within a religion.

We can see this occur in historic Judaism where the schools of Hillel and Shammai sometimes gave different interpretations of the Torah. Within Islam, similar Quranic divergence can be seen between the schools of Hanafi, Malaki, Shafei and Hanbali.

Where divergence of interpretation is accepted as legitimate (and not dismissed as heresy), this leads inevitably to rival schools holding views which can even seem contradictory. Despite the apparent contradictions, rival interpretations can still both be “true” expressions of a faith. This is because they both express loyalties to accepted processes of interpretation.

An example of this kind of approach has arisen in some Christian communities over the ordination of women. For example, when the Church of England allowed women priests in 1994, it set up a system of “Flying bishops” to minister to parishes which did not accept women’s ordination. This meant that within the church there was simultaneously both an acceptance and a non-acceptance of women priests. Despite the appearance of contradiction, both approaches still represented a “truth” because they were both instances of loyalty to accepted, but divergent ways of interpreting the Scriptures.

Doctrine and Authority

If approaches to the Euthyphro dilemma result in affinities towards different models of faith and truth, we can see these affinities also extending into the character of whether a religion is doctrinal, or not.

Religions based on a reality model of goodness (e.g., Natural Law) with a belief model of faith and a rational model of truth, cannot allow contradictory claims. So, when religious questions arise, they must be settled as either true, false, or as awaiting further resolution. When a claim is settled as true it becomes a doctrine (or dogma). When it is rejected as false it becomes a heresy. And so religions based on reality models of goodness will, over time, typically acquire a body of dogma (and heresy).

Furthermore, that religion will also need to acquire a mechanism for distinguishing truth from falsity, such as infallible church councils (etc.). This is because if the nature of reality determines goodness, then a religion must be able to indisputably clarify the nature of reality. If it cannot do this, then that religion will fail to be an effective religion because it is unable to transmit the information necessary to help its followers become good.

Religions based on a Will model of goodness (e.g., Divine Command theory) with a trust model of faith and a loyalty model of truth can be more relaxed about doctrines and contradictory beliefs or practices. If there is no specific “reality” determining the goodness of people’s actions, then goodness is just a matter of whether people’s actions can be construed as “loyal” to God, or not.

When a model of truth as loyalty is interpreted in terms of a principle like “acting with love,” then a Church can end up allowing divergent views on issues like abortion, euthanasia, divorce, etc. This is because followers can be loyal to a principle such as “acting with love” even if they interpret it and apply it in contradictory ways.

Conclusion

Amongst the many different religions and denominations, there is an enormous range of views about goodness, faith, truth, and doctrine. Some of these views overlap and some contrast. Some views even integrate contrasting elements from different models. The overall complexity of religions means that attempts to group them into neat models will always end up being an oversimplification.

However, affinities can be seen between sets of views and interpretations of religious claims. For example, a reality model of goodness (e.g., Natural Law ethics) creates affinities for a belief model of faith, a rationality model of truth and a religion which is doctrinal.

When a religion adopts a Will model of goodness (e.g., Divine Command ethics) it may well create affinities for a trust model of faith, a loyalty model of truth and a religion which is less concerned about doctrines.

These affinities are not entailments, so people can, and do, adopt different elements of the models. However, to the extent that there are affinities between the elements of different sets of views, then philosophical starting points are having very real influences upon theological conclusions.

It raises the prospect that some religious disagreements about the interpretations of Scriptures may not actually be a religious disagreement at all. People may claim to be reading views out of Scripture, but the reality may be that they are really reading into the Scriptures perspectives which have affinities with their Euthyphric philosophical assumptions.