The Principle of Subsidiarity: An Abdication of Authority, Or, the Decentralization of Functions?

Is the principle of subsidiarity employed, that local governments and communities assume ultimate authority over functions which could be undertaken by a higher level of government? Or, are local governments and communities, better suited to handle these functions based upon their proximity to the needs of their citizens?

The concept of subsidiarity is found first in the thought of Aristotle:

Aristotle’s political theory was constructed with the city-state (polis) of classical antiquity specifically in mind. The polis, he said, is a composition two smaller categories of community, the household (oikia) and the village (kome) (Politics, I.1-2). Every community is established with some good in view. Households and villages are formed to secure the bare necessities of life, whereas the polis is fully self-sufficient (autarkeia) in securing the necessities of life, and can thus be concerned with securing the ‘good life,’ which is the chief end of humankind. Because it aims at ‘the most authoritative and all-encompassing good,’ the polis is ‘the supremely authoritative community’ (Politics, I.2, 1252a1-7).

Thus, while families and villages may be prior to it in time, the polis is prior to them in nature or essence, just as the whole is prior to the part (Politics, I.2, 1253a18-29).

The same is true of other smaller or less significant kinds of association—such as clans, tribes, religious guilds and social clubs—these too are formed for limited and partial goods—in contrast to the polis, which is constituted for the common good (Nicomachean Ethics, VIII.9, 1160a9-30; Politics, III.9, 1280b36-39).

Aristotle denied, however, that the polis should simply replace or supplant the smaller associations and communities of which it is composed. Distinguishing his position from that of Plato (Republic, V, 449a-466d), Aristotle opposed an ‘extreme unification’ of the polis, and rejected the proposition that ‘the highest unity of a state is its highest good’ (Politics, II.2, 1261b6-15). Rather, a plurality or multitude of persons (plethos) is of the very nature of a city-state and a ‘lesser degree of unity is preferable to the greater’ (Politics, II.2, 1260b36-1261b15). The polis should not, therefore, altogether displace smaller associations, such as the household, as through the community of wives and property that was suggested by Plato (Republic, III, 416d; V, 449a-466d). The city-state, the village and the household are all species of community (koinonia), even though the polis is uniquely the community of which the lesser communities are but ‘parts’ (Politics, I.2, 1252b15-16, 27–30, 1253a15-18).[1]

In ancient Greece, the polis (city) was the supremely authoritative community, it was the ultimate political and social structure that defined the lives of its citizens. Household and villages, were formed to secure the bare necessities of life. Even so, the concept of subsidiarity, did not suggest that the polis altogether displace smaller associations, such as: households, villages, clans, tribes, religious guilds and social clubs. Rather, households and villages, in addition to these smaller associations, were founded to obtain limited and partial goods, while the polis, was established to ensure the common good.

As regards the Catholic Church, the principle of subsidiarity is articulated first in the social teaching of Pope Pius XI, within the encyclical, Quadragesimo Anno: 

…Leo XIII, boldly breaking through the confines imposed by Liberalism, fearlessly taught that government must not be thought a mere guardian of law and of good order, but rather must put forth every effort so that “through the entire scheme of laws and institutions. . . both public and individual well-being may develop spontaneously out of the very structure and administration of the State” (cf. Encyclical, On the Condition of Workers, 48). Just freedom of action must, of course, be left both to individual citizens and to families, yet only on condition that the common good be preserved and wrong to any individual be abolished. The function of the rulers of the State, moreover, is to watch over the community and its parts; but in protecting private individuals in their rights, chief consideration ought to be given to the weak and the poor. “For the nation, as it were, of the rich is guarded by its own defenses and is in less need of governmental protection, whereas the suffering multitude, without the means to protect itself relies especially on the protection of the State. Wherefore, since wageworkers are numbered among the great mass of the needy, the State must include them under its special care and foresight” (cf. Encyclical, On the Condition of Workers, 54).[2]

Here one can see, just freedom of action (one’s ability to act freely for the good, without being prevented or physically constrained) must remain with individuals and families. And, that the community and all its parts be justly defended and overseen, structure and administration must be left to the state. That through the state’s special care and foresight, the common good be safeguarded and wrong to any individual be abolished.

Thus, the state should not,

interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving the latter of its functions, but rather should support it in case of need and help to co-ordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of society, always with a view to the common good.[3]

As this relates to the system of government adopted in the United States, there is an additional level of political organization known as Federalism: “a stronger central government to handle national and international issues, while leaving most day-to-day governance in the hands of the states, which were seen as being closer and more responsive to the people.”[4] Toward this end, the founding fathers sought to ensure:

…that power is not concentrated at one level or in one branch, federalism makes it difficult for any single entity to gain absolute control, thereby reducing the risk of tyranny and protecting individual liberty.

The system was not designed to be frictionless. The overlapping jurisdictions and inherent tension between state and federal authority were intentional. These conflicts are the very mechanism through which the balance of power is constantly debated, negotiated, and redefined, ensuring that the government remains accountable to the people it serves.[5]

The first point to be made here, concerns the statement: the system was not designed to be frictionless. The federal government can certainly attempt to overstep the authority held by the state, just as the state, can attempt to legislate beyond its own authority, entering the realm of authority proper to the federal government.

A recent example of the federal government entering into the realm of authority held by state and local businesses, is the 2021 Biden Administration vaccine mandates. And, a clear example of state overreaching into federal matters, is seen in the ongoing conflict in Texas over border security, as, the federal government has primary authority over matters concerning immigration.

Therefore, there should always be a proper criterion for the just intervention of a higher level of governance in state or local affairs: the preservation of the dignity of the human person, the common good is being threatened, local governance is not meeting the needs of its citizens, greater coordination is needed between higher and lower levels of governance, or, the complexity of issues exceeds the capacity of lower levels of governance.

This being true, one should recognize a disturbing trend that is all too prevalent in the current day. And, that is, the choice of individuals who possesses legitimate authority over others, or, have been elected or appointed to a position that includes – an authority proper to it – who then seek to decentralize, abdicate, or even exceed the authority proper to one’s vocation. This path is typically sought out, that one avoid having to make difficult decisions concerning other individuals, out of the fear of being held accountable, or, simply out of the fear of not being accepted by those under his charge. For these reasons, the individual who holds legitimate authority, would rather establish a committee approach to decision making, that he not be singled out as one who had to make a difficult decision. Especially, if this decision is later viewed by others as the wrong decision.

Thus, the question becomes, is it just to abdicate the authority proper to one’s state in life, or, the authority one has been given through one’s election or appointment? This is best illustrated through examples. An example of relinquishing authority proper to one’s state in life, is that of a father who refuses to be a true father to his son, and would prefer instead, to relate to his son as a peer or friend. This is neither just to the father himself, who, as an adult should have learned to accept and live out the responsibilities proper to his state in life (and – willfully choosing not to do so, enters the realm of sin). Additionally, this is gravely unjust to the son, who looks to his father, not only for his physical needs, but also, for his emotional, spiritual, and moral development.

An example, concerning a public official (Judge), is as follows:

…[I]n Matter of Greenfeld, 71 NY2d 389 (1988), the Court of Appeals upheld the Commission’s determination to remove a village justice from office for inter alia improperly permitting the deputy village attorney to accept guilty pleas and determine the amount of fines in various cases.[6]

Undoubtably, it is improper for a village justice (an elected, or appointed official) to permit others to determine matters that lie clearly in the scope of authority proper to a village justice.

Surely, one can see, there is strong need for the principle of subsidiarity: that, the dignity of the human person be respected and upheld; that, what is just be carried out in a timely manner; that, the common good be served with conviction; and that, all laws and governance be shown to have their roots in Eternal law.

St. Thomas Aquinas confirms this within the Summa Theologiae, I-II, Q. 93, a. 3:

As stated above (Q. 90 AA. 1, 2), the law denotes a kind of plan directing acts towards an end. Now wherever there are movers ordained to one another, the power of the second mover must needs be derived from the power of the first mover; since the second mover does not move except in so far as it is moved by the first. Wherefore we observe the same in all those who govern, so that the plan of government is derived by secondary governors from the governor in chief; thus the plan of what is to be done in a state flows from the king’s command to his inferior administrators: and again in things of art the plan of whatever is to be done by art flows from the chief craftsman to the under-crafts-men, who work with their hands. Since then the eternal law is the plan of government in the Chief Governor, all the plans of government in the inferior governors must be derived from the eternal law. But these plans of inferior governors are all other laws besides the eternal law. Therefore all laws, in so far as they partake of right reason, are derived from the eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that in temporal law there is nothing just and lawful, but what man has drawn from the eternal law.[7]

[1] Aroney, N. (2014). Subsidiarity in the Writings of Aristotle and Aquinas. P 13–14. In: Evans, M., Zimmermann, A. (eds) Global Perspectives on Subsidiarity. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 37. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-8810-6_2

[2] Pope Pius XI. Quadragesimo Anno. P 25. 15 May 1931. Libreria Editrice Vaticana. https://www.vatican.va/content/pius-xi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno.html

[3] Catholic Church. Catechism of the Catholic Church: Revised in Accordance with the Official Latin Text Promulgated by Pope John Paul II, 2nd ed. (Vatican City; Washington, DC: Libreria Editrice Vaticana; United States Catholic Conference, 1997), 1883.

[4] GovFacts. Federal vs. State Laws: Who Has Authority Over What in America. P 8. accessed September 14, 2025. https://govfacts.org/explainer/federal-vs-state-laws-who-has-authority-over-what-in-america/

[5] Ibid., P 9–10.

[6] New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct. Improper Delegation of Judicial Responsibilities. P 2. accessed September 14, 2025. https://cjc.ny.gov/Policy.Statements/delegation_of_authority.html

[7] Thomas, and Dominican Province. 1947. Summa Theologica: first complete american edition in three volumes. New York: Benziger., vol. I, ST I-II, Q. 93, a. 3.