Three Ways of Knowing: Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Protestantism

When observers compare and contrast the Christian religious denominations of Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Protestantism, similarities and differences become apparent. This is especially so in terms of their religious epistemologies, which explain how and why believers can know which religious beliefs are appropriate.

Before pursuing matters a caveat is necessary. While there are certainly differences between religious denominations, there are also significant diversities within denominations, especially when it comes to the subtleties and nuances of religious epistemologies. What follows is therefore just a broad-brush overview of the trends of different models, rather than a specific historical analysis of denominational claims.

1. Does Each Denomination Have a Religious Epistemology?

Epistemology is an aspect of philosophy. It studies questions relating to belief and knowledge. It asks what makes beliefs rationally (to use a neutral term) “appropriate.”

Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Protestantism have all, at times, distinguished between appropriate and inappropriate beliefs (e.g., heresy). It would be impossible for a denomination to clarify what counts as inappropriate belief, unless there was underlying thinking about what makes a belief appropriate.

This means that each denomination must have a religious epistemology embedded in its attitudes and thinking patterns, even if the existence of that epistemological model is not clearly or explicitly acknowledged in the denomination’s formal theologizing.

2. Protestant Epistemology

A Protestant religious epistemology typically determines the appropriateness of a belief depending on whether it is contained in, or taught by, “Scripture (alone).”

There are some clear advantages to a religious epistemology which appeals to an objective written text. This is because objective texts can be a kind of written constitution for what can count as appropriate belief, and “written constitutions” can be an effective way of ensuring clarity for organizations. They can also be effective ways of avoiding risks related to the misuse or abuse of leaders’ powers.

At the time of the Protestant Reformation (1517) there were some serious concerns about the behavior of contemporary popes (such as Alexander VI [d. 1503], Julius II [d. 1513] and Leo X [d. 1521]). There were also concerns about the way that some religious practices seemed open to financial abuse (such as donations linked to Indulgences).

Against that background of concerns, it is not at all surprising, theologically, sociologically or psychologically, that Protestantism developed an epistemology which identified an objective written text as having the supreme authority to judge all other individuals and practices.

3. Three Questions Raised by Protestant Epistemology

Firstly, it is arguable whether “Scripture alone” is an accurate description of how Christianity actually works. For example, Christians hold beliefs about which books should be in their Bibles, but there is no statement in the Bible listing the content of the Bible. (See “Bible Canon: Can Scripture Solve the Problem?”) This implies that Christians hold more beliefs as “appropriate,” than can be found within Scripture alone.

Secondly, an appeal to a text always raises questions of interpretation. This is why countries with written constitutions invariably have a constitutional court, which has the authority to interpret the written constitution. For example, in 2024 there was a disagreement about whether the 14th Amendment barred Donald Trump from standing for president. The appropriate interpretation of the constitution could only be resolved by the Supreme Court.

When Christians appeal to the Biblical text as having a supreme authority, questions of interpretation similarly arise. But, there is no authoritative mechanism within Protestantism, which can act like a constitutional court to interpret Scripture. The practical need to make authoritative interpretations of Scripture (such as over matters like admitting women to the priesthood) means that Christian communities often tend to end up acting “as if” they held a power to interpret Scripture. That “gap” in the epistemological model raises questions about its adequacy.

A third problem arises for this epistemological model, when the problem of interpretation is resolved by individuals appealing to inspirations from the Holy Spirit. That approach turns what is meant to be an epistemology of an objective text, into an epistemology of subjective thoughts and feelings. (See “Montanus and the Problem of Hearing the Holy Spirit.”) That approach ends up undermining the very rationale for implementing an epistemological model of an objective text.

4. Orthodox Epistemology

An Orthodox religious epistemology typically determines the appropriateness of a belief depending on whether it is contained in, or taught by, Scripture and Tradition.

A significant advantage of this epistemology is that it can resolve otherwise intractable theological problems, such as the question of the Biblical canon. With Scripture and Tradition it doesn’t matter that the Biblical canon is not clearly taught in Scripture, as it can be contained in, and taught by, Tradition.

An appeal to Tradition also helps to resolve other questions of Scriptural interpretation. For example, St John’s Gospel states:

For my flesh is true food, and my blood is true drink. (John 6:55)

Orthodox (and Catholic) theologians interpret this text as indicating a Eucharistic real presence. Orthodox theologians can explain the appropriateness of that interpretation as arising because it is one that is endorsed by Tradition.

This means that an epistemological model of Scripture and Tradition is clearly effective in resolving problems which cannot easily be resolved by an appeal to Scripture alone.

5. Three Questions Raised by Orthodox Epistemology

Firstly, it is arguable whether “Scripture and Tradition” is a complete description of how Christianity actually works. In the same way that questions of interpretation can arise about Scripture, they can also arise about Tradition. (See “Old Calendarism: A Problem Interpreting Tradition?”)

As a result, since the earliest days of Christianity, appeals to Scripture and Tradition have been supplemented with an episcopal authority, which has the epistemological role of interpreting what counts as appropriate interpretations and beliefs. We can see that model in the background of the New Testament Epistle 1 Timothy, where Timothy is charged to defend the faith and refute false teachers.

Secondly, even a model of “Scripture + Tradition + bishop” is not quite adequate, as sometimes bishops themselves have disagreed about the correct interpretation of Scripture and Tradition. This occurred in the Arian disputes of the fourth century, and it took the Council of Nicaea (325) to resolve matters.

This shows that an important part of Orthodox (and Catholic) epistemology is the role of Synods and Ecumenical Councils, as the ultimate arbiters of what counts as the appropriate interpretation of Scripture and Tradition. This means that a model of just “Scripture and Tradition” is not an accurate or complete description of how Christianity has actually worked historically.

Thirdly, even an appeal to Ecumenical Councils raises questions of interpretation. Orthodoxy only recognizes Seven Ecumenical Councils (up until AD 787). However, Roman Catholics accept another 14 councils. That Catholic acceptance includes the Council of Florence (1449) which Orthodoxy initially seemed to accept, before then rejecting. If Ecumenical Councils are the ultimate court of appeal, how can a dispute about a council be resolved?

Perhaps the solution is to call another Ecumenical Council to resolve matters, but then what are the criteria for whether a new council should count as genuinely Ecumenical? More significantly, can Orthodoxy call a genuine Ecumenical Council without inviting all Roman Catholic bishops to attend, as happened in previous Ecumenical Councils? Questions like this prompt a diversity of opinions, which do not seem to be solvable by appeal to Scripture or to Tradition, or by reference to prior teaching of (agreed) Ecumenical Councils. This means that there is a problematic “gap” which raises questions about the adequacy of this epistemological model.

6. Catholic Epistemology

A Catholic religious epistemology follows a tripartite model. The appropriateness of belief is determined by whether it is contained within, or taught by, “Scripture, Tradition and Magisterium.”

Vatican II described the model in these words:

It is clear, therefore, that sacred tradition, Sacred Scripture and the teaching authority of the Church… are so linked and joined together that one cannot stand without the others. (Dei Verbum 10)

This tripartite model has the advantage of providing an epistemological mechanism (i.e., Magisterium) which can resolve any question of interpretation about Scripture or Tradition. A living Magisterium can also resolve questions about its own interpretation.

This model also has the arguable benefit of being an accurate description of how Christianity worked in its formative Patristic Era, where there were authoritative interventions of individuals and/or councils which made magisterial pronouncements to resolve theological questions.

However, it is sometimes objected that an appeal to “‘magisterium” is a corruption of (an epistemology of) Scripture and Tradition. Or, it is said that an appeal to a magisterium elevates humans above the authority of Scripture.

But is that really so? Or is an explicit reference to a Magisterium just an open and honest admission of what all Christians end up being implicitly committed to, when Churches act “as if” they had a Magisterial authority to interpret Scripture, or “as if” they had some other access to a divine Magisterial interpretation of Scripture. (See “Magisterium: Blessing or Curse?”)

7. Three Questions Raised by Catholic Epistemology

Firstly, the Vatican has accepted that the Magisterium can be deficient. In 1990 it stated:

It could happen that some Magisterial documents might not be free from all deficiencies. (Donum Veritatis 24)

The Society of Saint Pius X insists that Vatican II was “deficient” and that the Magisterium’s defense of the Council is also deficient. (See SSPX conflict with the Vatican.) How is that dispute to be resolved, unless there is greater clarification about how to identify when the Magisterium is deficient?

A second set of questions involve the papal magisterium. Vatican I said that the papal magisterium is the final court of appeal to resolve queries about interpreting Scripture and Tradition. It stated that the pope has

full and supreme power in all matters relating to faith and morals… discipline and governance. (Pastor Aeternus 3.9)

But there are a range of unresolved theological questions around the possibility of the individual who holds the papal office, also happening to be a heretic, and thereby losing the ability to exercise the papal magisterium. Those kinds of issues are directly raised by contemporary Sedevacantism, as a reason to reject the Magisterium of modern popes who they dismiss as anti-popes. Without greater clarity in canon law about the resolution of issues involving accusations of papal heresy, it is difficult to see how issues like this can be resolved.

Thirdly, there are a set of unresolved questions surrounding inappropriate use of Magisterial powers, especially when they have adverse impacts upon individuals. In 2003 Cardinal Ratzinger (Pope Benedict XVI) illustrated this issue with the example of Friedrich Wilhelm Maier, who was fired from his job teaching Scripture in 1912. His “crime” was to teach the two-source theory of the Synoptics, which is now a commonly accepted view. In Ratzinger’s view:

…with this [action], the credibility of the Magisterium was diminished and the space necessary for research and exegetical questions was excessively restricted. (Relationship between Magisterium and Exegetes)

Incidents like this raise a question about how the Church can avoid the Magisterium being similarly “diminished” in the future. To the extent that there is unclarity about how the “credibility of the Magisterium” can be ensured in the future, then there is a “gap” in the epistemological model which can lead to questions about its adequacy.

That realization brings us full circle to where we began with Protestant epistemology, above in section 2. Arguably, that model was attempting to deal (to some extent) with issues raised by precisely the risks of a misuse of powers which “diminishes” and “undermines the credibility” of Church authorities.

8. Conclusion 

An overview of Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Protestantism raises interesting questions about their models of religious epistemology, even if the broad-brush depictions above are somewhat generalized and simplistic in their lack of nuance.

Arguably, all of the models raise questions of adequacy. So, arguably there is unfinished theologizing confronting each denomination.

One of the reasons why it is important to reflect on models of religious epistemology, is that those models can have a direct impact upon the outcomes of Ecumenical dialogue. This is because different models of religious epistemology can lead to different views about which theological positions are “appropriate.”

If denominations enter Ecumenical discussions with different (and incomplete) models about what makes a religious belief “appropriate,” how can they possibly expect to reach comprehensive agreement on which beliefs actually are appropriate?